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ELECTRONIC RECONNAISSANCE FROM
THE HIGH SEAS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
Oliver J. Lissilzyn
The controv('rsy he tween the United
SLateR and the North Korean auLhorities
('onsl'qlH:nt upon the seizure by the
laLL('r of U.S,S. Pueblo on 2:~ January
I ')(IB revolved in part around lJul'stions
of facl. Th,~ North Korl'an aulhorili,!S
ael'us('d Ill!' !'hip or delilll'r:1t,'ly intruding into the L!'rritorial s,'a c1ainu'd
by them (apparently 12 miles in widLh):
the United StaL!'s dl'nied thaL the ship
had approached the North Korl'an ('oast
so c1osl'ly, A t no Lillie, ael'ording to
published data, have the NorLh Kon'an
authorities asserted the right to seize Lhe
ship on the ground that it had been
('Ilgagcd in eleels lInie reconnaissance of
North Korl'a while n'maining on the
high t'cas. Abstenlion from making such
a claim of right corn-sponds to Ill('
pa\l('rn of ('O/Hlud follow,'d in ,'0111par:1hlt- silualilln~ hy Ih,- Sodd Ilnioll.'
Tlll'rt- i~. fllrllll'rmort'. no availahlt, ,·\,ieI"III'" Ihat lilt, Nmlh (\01"'0111 alllhorili,'~
hav,' formally I'w,'lainwd or c'~lahli~I\I'd
oul~i(!t, IIII' L!'rrilorial S"iI "laimc,(1 h\'

them a contiguous zone for security
control of navigation.
I t has, nevertheless, been suggested
that there may he a Lrend in internalional law loward Ih,' emergl'ncc~ of a
righl 10 prodaim ilnd cnforl'e on Ihl'
hi:dl s,'as ('olltiguous zonl's of unI'pl'(:i fit'd ex ten L for the: prcven tion or
control of electronic reconnilissance by
ron'ign vesspls, including warships.2 Although furl her IcdlJlologieal proh'l'CSS
mily make sueh reconnaissance less and
less usci'ul, its utility cannot
said to
have already disappeared. Consequently,
it seems appropriate to consider the
extent, if any, to which such a trend has
actuillly manifestl'd itself.
I t is conCl'ivahle that under internalional law a ('oastal staL!' could have at
le'a,,1 Ilm'l' killel!' of rip:hls d"!'ip:nl'cI to
"lIahl" il 10 pn'\','111 or 1'IIIIIrol fllf('ip:1I
,'It'c'l rOlli,' \'I"'lIl1l1ai:-::-:anl'I' fro II I aeljlll'l'lIl
art'a~ of Iht' high ~t'as:
Fir:-:I. tlu: righL 10 prodaim COIItiguous zones in whieh il could forhid
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all vessels, including foreign warships, to
engage in electronic reconnaissance of
any kind, with a concomitant right to
enforce such prohibition by seizure and
forfeiture of the offending ship and,
possibly, imposition of criminal penalties upon the ship's personnel. In the
Pueblo incident, the North Korean
authorities seem to have, in fact, eo me
close to enforcing the policy underlying
such a possible right, without publicly
enunciating or justifying it.
Second, the right to proclaim contiguous zones in which the collection of
information about the coastal state by
electronic means would be regarded as a
violation of international law by the
state engaged in such collection, but
without the right to seize the foreign
ships concerned.
Third, the rip:ht to punish individuals,
ineluding members of foreign armed
forces, for engaging in ·forbiddcn electronic reconnaissance, in a contiguous
zone of the high seas, when such individuals are apprehended within the territorial jurisdiction of the offended state.
Such a right, hy itself, would probably
be the least dfective safeguard of the
intrn'st of tht' coastal stall' in controlling elrclronic reconnais:::'\Il('t'. II
could be combined, howevt'r, with the
second type of po !'Sible right:::.
But the statement that a state conceivahly could have certain rights under
international law docs not imply that it
already has them or that there is a trend
toward the emergence of such rights or
that it is desirable for them to exist.
Rules of international law usually reflect an accommodation of several interests and rest on a consensus which
can be formally manifested in a treaty
or inferred from uniformities in the
practice of states. What, then, arc the
relevant existing or emerging rules?
The most authoritative, though not
uniwr:::ally hinliin~ in u formal !'('m;p,
guidi'S to the rdevanl inlernational law
of the sea today art' two (; 1'l1(wa Convenlions on the Law of thl' Spa

concluded in 195B-tlll' Convention 011
the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous
Zone and the Convention on the High
Seas. 3 Not all states-or even a majoritr
of states-are parties to these treaties.
In particular, North Korea, which is not
recognized as a state by a large number
of states, is not entitled to become a
party to either of these conventions. s
Nevertheless, since many of the provisions of these treaties represent rules
generally accepted by the international
community, they are an appropriate
starting point for an analysis of the
relevant content of international law
and of trends in it.
Directly relevant to the question of
establishment of contiguous zones for
security purposes is article 24 of the
Convention on the Territorial Sea and
thl' Contiguous Zone, which reads as
follows:
1. In a zone of the high seas
contiguous to its territorial sea,
the coastal state may exercise the
control necessary to:

(a) Prevent infringement of
its customs, fiscal, immigration or
:-:anitary n'~lIlations within its 1erritory or tcrriturial s('a:
(II) Punish ill frillW'JII('llt of
the ahove regulations commiLled
within its territorial sea.
2. The contiguous zone JIIay
not extend beyond twelve miles
from the basrline from which the
breadth of the territorial sea is
measured.
3. Where the coasts of two
states are opposite or adjacent to
each other, neither of the two
states is entitled, failing agreement
hetwet'n them to the contrary, to
ex teml its contiguolls ZOl1l1 h('yond the median linc l'vcry point
of which is (~quidistant from the
lIl'an~st Peints on tlll~ h<l~('lin('s
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frolll which the hn'adth of thl'
LerriLoriul ~eas of Llw Lwo sLuLes is
mcasured.
IL will he noLed Lhut "!:ccurity" is not
onr of the specified purpo~es for which
contiguous zones may bc established.
The omission is deliberate. The draft
articles prepared by thc International
I,aw Commission which formed the
husis of the work of the 1958 Conference on the Law of the Sea contained a
provision similar to the first two sections of the finally adopted text of
article 24. It did not contain lIny mention of "sl'l'uritv" but al!:o olllilled till'
word "imllli~r~tion.'·6 A t the Conft'rencr, Poland proposed that pllrll~raph
I of the arLicle he replacrd hy the
following text: "In a zone of the high
sl'as contiguous to its territorial sea, the
coastal state Illay take the measures
necessary to prevent and punish infringcmcnts of its customs, fiscal or
sunilary r~ulations, and violations of its
security. "
In thc First CommiLlee of the Confl'rc~nce, whl're urnendments required
only a simple majority, the Polil:'h propOl:'al was adopted, aftrr lillie reportrd
di8cu~8ion, hy a votr of ~~3 to ~7, with
15 ahstentions. s But in the ph'nury
IIIrcting, whrrl~ u t\>'o-thirds majority
was ncccssary, the proposal failed of
adoption, receiving 40 votes against 27
nrgative votes, with nine ahstcntiom:.
I nsh'ad, the Conferencc adopted, by ()()
votes to none, with ]:3 lIbstentions, a
(I.S. propo~al which became thc text of
urticle 24.9 Again, there was virtually
no rrportrd discu~!:ion, and the name~
of the statt!S voting for and against the
proposal are not listrd.
Although the Polish proposal thus
n'cl'ived a clear majority of the delegations voting (though not of the H7
dl'legations prrsrnt at the Conrt'renre),
thr Im·k of a singlt' vote in oppo~ition t(}
till' U.S. propol:'al suggesLs thut the
I'l'ntinwnt in fu\'or of the Polil:'h propm:al was not a~ I:'trong m: the numhl'r of

vo\('$ cast for it might indicate. This
impression is furLher horne out by the
failure of any stute, upon signing, raLifying, or acceding to the convention, to
reserve its right to estahlish contiguous
zones for security purposes, although
numerous reservations have been entered to other provisions of the convention. IO Nevertheless, it should be noted
that numerous states, including Poland
and the Republic of Korea, are not
parties to the convention. 1 1 Some
states, including Poland, have had provisions in their national legislation for
&'eurity zones in the adjacent areas of
the high St·US. I2 It cannot be said,
thereforc, that article 24, in limiting
contiguous zont'S to the purpos(~s stu ted
in it, has dedared or estahlish(·d a rule
clearly applicable to states which are
not parties to the convcntion. I3 But the
evidence dors not indicate any trend in
state practice toward cxpanding or
strengthening claims of right to establish
contiguous zones for security purposes.
In particular, the authorities of North
Korea do not appear to have proclaimed
any such zones.
t\rticll' 24 of the Convention on the
Tt'rritorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone
contains .lIlother rdt'vunt limitation. It
statrs that n l!ontigllous zoue "uUly not
\·x It'ntl ht~yontl twt,lvr milt,s fl'Om tlll~
hal'c1ine from which the hrcmlLh of tlll~
territorial sea is measured." This means
that a state which claims a territorial sea
of 12 miles-as do the North Korean
authorities-may not have a contiguous
zone at all. Although this limitation has
also been criticized by some writers, 1 4
it appears to have encountered virtually
no opposi Lion in the 1958 Conference.1s But it cannot he said to be
ahsolutely clear that iL applies to states
which are not parties to the convention.
But even if the pro\'it'ions on conti~uous zones contnined in the Convention on till: Tt'rritorial Sea and the
Contiguous Zone arc regarded as inapplicable to states which are not
partie:; to the conVt'ntioll, it docs not
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foHow that they have a right to cnforce
eontig;uous zones for security purpoi'es
by seizing or otherwise interfering with
foreign warships on the high seas.
Article fl of the 195B Convention on the
High Seas provides:

1. Warships on the high seas
have complete immunity from the
jurisdiction of any state other
than the flag state.
2. For the purposes of these
articles, the term "warship"
means a ship belonging to the
naval forces of a state and bearing
the external marks distinguishing
warships of its nationality, under
the command of an officer duly
commissioned by the government
and whose name appears in the
Navy List, and manncd by a crew
who are under regular naval discipline.
The term "high seas," furthermore, is
defined in article L as meaning "all parts
of tIll' sea that are not included in the
tcrritorial sea or in the internal waters
of a state." Since article 24 of tIlt'
Convention on the Territorial Sea aIHI
the Contiguous Zone refers to "a zonc
of the high seas contiguous to ... territorial sea," it seems clear that the
ahsolute immunity of warships provided
in article fl of the Convention on the
IIigh Seas extrnds to war:;hips within
the contiguous zone of another state.
This provision, moreover, mm;t he
regarded as declaratory of general international law and applicahle to aH states,
regardless of their being parties to the
convention. The Preamhle of the Convention on the lIigh Seas speaks of its
provisions as heing "generally declaratory of estahlished principles of international law." No such statrment appcars
in <Illy of the othcr II)!)B Conventions
on thc I.aw of the !-I('a. Arti('h' B,
llIon'over, was mlopll'd without di:-:l'('nl.
and no :;tat(~ has mad(, any n':;crvation
with rr:;pect to it. 16

This view is supported uy the practice of states. Dei'pite the tensions
associated with the cold war and similar
political conflicts, states have generally
refrained from claiming the legal right
to interfcre with foreign warships or
aircraft outside their territorial seas or
territorial airspace, even when there
were grounds for helieving that the ships
or aircraft were engaged in electronic
reconnaissance in close proximity to the
territory of the coastal state. Partieularly significant in this connection is the
attitude of the Soviet Union in the U.N.
Security Cou~cil debates concerning the
shooting down hy Soviet planrs of U.S.
Air l~orcc patrol aircraft. During such a
ddlate in Scptemher 19;'4, after i'urh an
aireraft had hcen shot down oVI:r the
Sea of Japan,
No participant ..• asserted or admilled the right to shoot down
roreign reconnaissance aircraft
over the high seas, no maLLer how
closely it approached to the territorial sea. Vyshinsky, the Sovict
representative, stated:
I\Ir. Lodge said that tlw Soviet
Unioll rcprl$rntative wm; apparently defcnding the right of
the Sovict Union to shoot aireraft
down ov('r the high seas. I f I\(' hm!
not made his spc('ch in haste tl\('11
I alll sure 1\1r. Lodge would not
have said that, for my whole
argument on this question was
concentrated on proving that the
incident involving the Soviet and
United States aircraft occurred
over Soviet territory and not over
the high Sl'ilS. It is tl\('rrfore
ahsurd to suggest that I could l)(~
defending tlw right of any State
to shoot aircraft down over thc
high seas.

I t is olh('rs who wish to d('f('1111
this ril!hl. We are Oppol'('d to
it ... 17
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Very f:imilar was the dehate in Lhe
Security Council in 1960 after a U.S.
Air Force H.B-47 paLrol plane had been
shot down by Soviet aircraft. Again, the
Soviets charged the plane had intruded
inLo Soviet airspace and disoheyed an
order to land. None of the nations
involved in the debate-including the
U.S.S.R.-"claimed or admitted the
ri~ht of a state to shoot down a foreign
aircraft over the high seas, even if it flies
within close proximity of the state's
territory and even if it may he engaged
in military reconnaissancc," although
several representatives, including the
SovieL, "suggested that flights close to
the territorial sea of another counLry
may be undesirahle as possihly leading
to illcidl'nLs ..•" Indeed. LIlt' BriLish
reprrsenLaLive, wiLhout conLradicLion,
"expressly upheld the right to conduct
such flights for reconnaissance purposes,
and said that Soviet aircraft had engagcd
in such flights wiLhout being shot
down."!S And when North Korean
forces shot down a U.S. Navy EC-121
n'connaissance aircraft in April 1969,
once more the alle~aLion was that it had
inLruded inLo North Korean airspace.! 9
IL Lhus appears Lhat the Sovietllnion
and other Communist sLaLes or aUlhoritics have never officially claimed a right
10 attack or inlerfere with forcign aircraft over the high seas in proximity to
their coasts, on the ground that such
aircraft was, or could he reasonably
suspected of heing, engaged in cleetronic reconnaissance. There is nothing
to indicate, moreover, that foreign
surface vessels, and particularly foreign
warships, are in this respect considered
to be different from forcign aircraft.
And no staLe appears Lo have advanced
the view that electronic reconnaissance
from the high seas justifies an attack on
Ihe ship or aircraft engagcd in iL as a
matter of the coastal state's right of
sci f-,Icfcn:::e.
The record furlllt'r indicalt's Ihal
~ovieL-hloc govcrnmenls do nol appear
10 IHlve eVl'r offil'ially ass"rled Ilwl

electronic reconnaissance from the high
seas is a violation of in Lt'rnaLional law .
In this conlleclion, it is also signifieanL
that the Outer Space Treaty of 1967,2 0
which is largely a product of negotia.
tions heLween the Soviet Union and Lhe
United StaLes and to which both staLes
arc parties, contains no prohibition of
miliLary reconnaissance from outer
space.
The analysis here presenLed, which
indicates that there is no support in the
official claims or views of states for the
position that electronic reconnaissance
from the high seas justifies an attack
upon or interference with foreign ships
or aircraft engaged in such reconnaissance, is, of course, limited Lo the
relaLions of sLaLl~S aL pc:we with em:h
other. It is obvious that in time of war
enemy warships and military aircraft on
or over the high seas may be attacked,
whether or not they arc engaged in
reconnaissance. The question whether
the relations between the United States
and the NorLh Korean authorities in
196B and 1969 involved, despite the
armi!;tice of I ()!'i;3, dements of helligerency and Lherefore gave the laLLer a
right to <tLLaek U.S. warships and aircraft engaged in c1eetronie reconnaissance from Ihe high seas or airspace
ahove the high s,~as is ouL:;ide the senpe
of Lhis article. North Korean authorities
do not appear to have claimed any such
right in cOllneeLion wiLh the seizun~ of
the U.S.S. Pueblo or the shooting down
of the EC-12I.
It has been suggested thaL although
"passive" electronic reconnaissance
from the high seas may be permissible, a
different rule mayor should <Ipply to
"acLive" reconnaissance in which the
observing ship or aircraft sends, for
example, deceptive signals to create Lhe
fal:,(, irnprcggion thaL iL ig within Lh('
tt'rritorial g,'a or air:'pal'e of thl' coastal
,;tal(' for tlw Jlurpo",' of ((·"tilll! tl\('
latkr's reaclion lilllt'.2 J Although Ihi:;
diglinclion llIay hm'(' lht'orelical nwril,
il do('s not appt'ar 10 havt' 111'1'11
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officially and publicly drawn by any
state.
The suggcstion that there mayor
should he a trend in international law
toward making electronic reconnaissance from the high seas unlawful, and
permitting coastal states to establish
contiguous zones to prevent it, is, in
large part, based on the contention that
such reconniassance operates unfairly
against the smaller and weaker coastal
states that do not have the capabilities
to engage in similar reconnaissance
activities off the coasts of the stronger
states? 2 The record does not indicate
that such a trend is already under way.
First, the fact that on certain occasions Some states or authorities (including the U.S.S.R. as well as North
Korea) have actually attacked or interfered with foreign reconnaissance aircraft or vessels {as in the case of the
U.S.S. Pueblo) over or on the high seas
has no significance with respect to the
development of a new rule of law in the
light of their failure to admit such acts
or attempt to justify them in legal
terms. They have, indeed, sought in all
such cases to create the impression,
through official statements, that the
foreign aircraft or ships had violated
their sovereignty by intruding into their
territorial airspace or territorial sea and
that the acts of interference took place
in such airspace or sea. The failure to
claim a legal right of interference with
foreign vessels or aircraft on or over the
high seas in such situations shows that
the coastal states or authorities concerned did not helieve that such a claim
of right would be legally tenable or
acceptable to the international community or, perhaps, in their own best
interests.
Second, the number of small states
or entities that have committed such
acts of interference appears to havl'
been very small. The evilielll"e tlllll' fail~
to support the contention that small
states in general have an interest in
estahlishing a right to intl'rferl' with

foreign ships or airf'raft engngl'" in
e leclronic reeonnai~$al1l'e off thl'ir
coasts on or over the high seas.
Third, it is unlikely L1wt a new rule
of law assumed to he beneficial to the
smaller states will come into existence if
the stronger states do not favor it. By
hypothesis, the suggested rule would
work to the disadvantage of the stronger
states and therefore is not likely to gain
their support.
Fourth, there is no evidence that the
international community today regards
such a rule as desirable or that the
sentiment in its favor is increasing.
There remains the question of the
right of the coastal state to impose
criminal penalties on membl~rs of crews
of foreign reconnai:-::-:anel' ships mill aircraft for participation in intelligence
gathering from the high seas if they arc
subseqliently apprehended within the
territory of the coastal state. One of the
bases of criminal jurisdiction of states
over aliens is the so-called "protective
principle," which enables a state to
prosecute and punish in its courts
foreign nationals for eommiLLing nels
abroad against iLs security. Although the
scope of the principle is not well defincd and its employment in practice is
relatively infrequent, its existence is
wid('ly rccol-(niz('d in 111l~ Iill'ralur(' of
international law and is ren.:ctl:d in a
substantial number of provisions in national pcnal laws. After World War I, the
Frcnch Court of Cassation upheld its
application in the French courts against
foreign nationals such as a Spaniard who
was convicted of a crime against French
security committed during the war in
Spain by maintaining correspondence
with enemies of France.23 If this principle is interpreted broadly, it can be
applied to persons engaging in intelligl'nce gathcring, by electronic or other
III l'.1I1 1', from the high SI'<l!' or lwen from
II\(' Il'rrilol"Y of anollll'r ~I:III'. Sill'" II
hroad nppli~ation of thl' principlc. however, eould be regnrded as unrea!'onahle
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(dt'l'pile Llw Frt'l\l'h pn'Ceut'nls) mill
un~uJlJlorlt'd hy eonsislenL !'lall' Jlmelit·I'. In a world in whil"h all LIlt' I'lrollW'r
Jl0\\'I'rl' havt' mainlainl'd for a lOll!! linll'
largt' inlt'lIigt'nct'-galht'ring t'sluhlit'hnwnls, a lihl'rul uJlpliealion of Lhe "proll'l'liV!''' principlc would (~x pO!'e a suhslanlial number of individuals lo eriminul pcnalties and would probably work
to common disadvanlage.
Tlw fm:l lhaL Lhe persons accur;cd of
violuling lht' security of llw co.lslul sluLe
hy e1l'dronie reconnaissance aded in
llw prrformanct' of lheir oCficiul dUlies
Ut' mililary personnel or government
rlllployet's is anolher factor lo he con!'idcred. There arc old preeedenls for the
view lhuL soldier!' invading the Lcrrilory
of anolher slale ill lime of peuce cannol
bt' madc pcrsonully Iiablt' hy lhc lallcr
for the acls of violence lhey eommiL in
lhaL lerrilory pursuunl 10 ordt'rs;24 huL
in rt't'clIL y('urs a numher of uirmen
arriving in inlruding foreign military or
!'lalt~ uireraft haVI' bc('n prosccull!d and
punished for llw inlrut'ion wilhouL
giving rir;e lo the complainl lhaL such
exercise of jurisdiclion is unlawful
solcly 011 the ground lhuL thcy had
acled in the performance of official
duly.25 All lhese cases, however, huve
involved ehurges of inlrusion rUllwr lhan
reconnuis..<;unce from the high seus.
Tlwr(! uJlpears lo he no pn'e('denl for
proseculion hy a t:ouslul slull! of foreign
mililury or olher governmenl personnel
for lhe latter lype of aCLivity. The law
in lhis maller eannol hc rcgurtled Ut' wcIl
sl'lllrd, hut lhc official stalus of such

personnel is .1 weip;hL in Lhe hulunee
ugainsL lhc rrasonublencss ulld lawfulncss of such proseculion. Also, lhe
possihilily of such proseculion ufler Lhe
apprehension of the personnel concerncd wi thin the lerriLory of the
coastal slale cannoL hc regarded us an
rfft'clive !'aJl('lion uguinsl elt'dronic
rt'connaist'unce. This is slill mlOlhl'r
fa('[or 10 hl~ consith'rt'd in weighing mul
haluneing LllI' inll'resls involvl'd.
Apl'rt'ht'nsion of lilt' uceusI'd I'l'rsons
wilhin the lerriLory of lhc coat'lul t'lale
afll!r volunlary ('Illry inlo iL i!' noL likdy
10 III! u frl'lllll'nl ot'(:lIrn'lll:l', and LIlt!
I'lllploynll'nl of Ilris hust! of jllrisdic:lion
would he haplwzurd, lhrowing furllH'r
doubL on ils reasonableness. All in all, it
muy he concluded lhat inlernalionallaw
docs and should prohibit proseculion by
a coastal state of foreign military or
other government personnel for electronic reconnaissance from the high
seas.
Allhough inlernalional law docs noL
forbid eleclronic reconnaissance from
the high seas and docs not empower the
coastal slale lo inlerfere with foreign
wurships or aircraft engaged in iL, such
reeonnaissunce is likely lo IH~ resenLed
hy co as luI slutes and Lo heigh len inLernuLionul tensions. I t should he resorled
to, therefore, only if careful sludy
indieules that ils co!'ts are substanlially
oULweighed by ils benefils lo the staLe
Lhat cnguges in iL. The Iwed for il may
d('C\irw wilh the furlher dtwdo(lnlt'nL of
olher means of sllryC'iIIanee "nd inldli~t'n(·(' ~alh('rjn~.
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